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The European Union, the Euro, and Equity Market Integration
Abstract
At a time of historic challenges to the viability of the Eurozone, we assess the
contribution of the EU and the Euro to equity market integration in Europe. We
use a simple and essentially model free measure of bilateral market segmentation:
two countries are segmented if there is a wide divergence in the valuations of their
industries. We first establish that segmentation is significantly lower for EU versus non-
EU members. Bilateral valuation differentials remain lower for EU members even after
we control for several possible channels of integration, such as bilateral trade, direct
investment positions, financial regulation, and interest rate differences. Importantly,
we find that EU membership reduces equity market segmentation between member
countries whether or not members have also adopted the Euro. The Euro adoption as
well as the anticipation of the Euro adoption has minimal effects on market integration.
1 Introduction
No region in the world has done more to integrate its economies than the European coun-
tries, where the European Union (EU, henceforth) set out after World War II to free the
movement of goods and services, capital, and labor. Not surprisingly, a large literature has
attempted to assess the degree to which the European Union did or did not succeed in in-
tegrating markets across member countries. While Krueger (2000) finds that labor mobility
among member countries has not significantly increased after the elimination of the remain-
ing restrictions in 1993, Nicoletti, Haffner, Nickell, Scarpetta and Zoega (2001) document
that goods prices, especially for tradables, are more similar within the EU than among other
OECD countries. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) argue that increased trade and cross-border
investment among EU member countries have weakened the association between national
savings and investments more among EU and in particular Euro member countries than
among other OECD countries.
Many financial economists have examined to which extent European debt and equity
markets have become more integrated (see Baele, Ferrando, Hordahl, Krylova and Monnet
(2004) for a survey of the literature). Yield spreads are the dominant metric to gauge the
integration of debt markets, but measuring equity market integration is more challenging.
Most of the existing research uses equity returns to measure the relative importance of an EU
return factor (e.g. Hardouvelis, Malliaropulos and Priestley, 2006), dispersion or correlations
trends (e.g. Adjaouté and Danthine, 2004), or the degree of news and volatility spill-overs
among EU countries (see, for example, Baele, 2005; Fratzscher, 2002). A few studies also
investigate quantity based measures, for example documenting the degree of home bias over
time (for example Jappelli and Pagano, 2008).
We offer a different approach. We use stock market valuations of industry portfolios in
different countries to assess the degree of bilateral integration in Europe and the impact
of the EU. Stock market valuations reflect financial integration through their impact on
discount rates as well as economic integration through their impact on capitalized growth
opportunities. As we argue below, integration should lead to “valuation convergence” of
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similar firms across different countries.
In contrast to existing studies on equity market integration, our method is essentially
model-free, only requiring valuation ratios and therefore avoiding the joint hypothesis prob-
lem plaguing extant studies using equity return data. Valuation ratios also are much less
volatile than equity returns allowing more powerful statistical tests. Our actual measure-
ment focuses on the earnings yield, the inverse of the price-earnings ratio, which is easily
interpreted in economic terms.
We establish that EU membership reduced average bilateral earnings yield differentials,
with our estimates ranging from 60 basis points to as much as 330 basis points. This is a
large change in valuation differences. Using the simple intuition of a Gordon model, a two
percentage point change in the absolute valuation differential corresponds to a two percentage
point change in the difference of the cost of capital or in the expected earnings growth rate,
or a combination of the two.
This convergence happened against the backdrop of a global integration process that
led to valuation convergence across the world (see Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel,
2010). Our analysis identifies the effect of EU membership above and beyond a general
trend of global convergence. We also compare valuation differences in Europe with valuation
differences computed from randomized U.S. portfolios, matched by industry composition and
the number of firms per industry-country pair to our European data. We find that average
bilateral valuation differentials within Europe are still significantly above the levels observed
in U.S. data. But conditioning on EU membership, European valuation differentials become
indistinguishable from those observed in U.S. data in 2000.
Of course, EU membership is not exogenous; country characteristics that increase the
likelihood of early EU membership, such as economic and institutional development, may
well be correlated with a higher propensity to integrate with other member countries. While
it is very difficult to establish causality, the result of an independent EU effect is remarkably
robust. It survives in a difference-in-difference specification that controls for country-pair
and year fixed effects. It also survives and becomes even stronger in an instrumental variables
regression, where we use the distance to Brussels as an instrument for EU membership. Many
of the institutions of the EU are established in Brussels and a larger distance from Brussels
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slows down EU ascension.
While much of the literature has stressed the effects of the introduction of the Euro
on integration in Europe, we find only small and rather non robust effects of the Euro
introduction on valuation differentials. Moreover, the EU effect is unchanged when the Euro
introduction is added as an independent variable. We use our framework also to reflect on
the potential EU membership of Turkey.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our segmen-
tation measure and characterize its evolution over time. Because the segmentation measure
may be affected by temporary fluctuations in valuations and is bounded from below by zero,
we establish a benchmark using randomized U.S. portfolios. Section 3 sets out our main
regression framework and establishes the main results. In Section 4, we consider potential
channels through which EU membership may have affected valuation differentials, examining
among others, trade, FDI, regulation, financial development and differences in real interest
rates. The final section offers some concluding remarks.
2 Equity Market Integration through a Valuation Lens
2.1 A market segmentation measure
The famous Gordon model assumes that the discount rate, r, is constant and expected earn-
ings grow at a constant rate, g. If a firm pays out all earnings every year, its earnings yield
simply is r − g. Hence, in this simple model, discount rates and growth opportunities are
linearly related to the earnings yields. To come up with aggregate measures, suppose that
systematic risk is industry rather than firm specific, as typically assumed in capital bud-
geting. Financial market integration then equalizes “industry betas” as well as risk premia
across countries. Furthermore, assume that in economically integrated countries persistent
growth opportunities are mostly industry rather than country specific or at least rapidly
transmitted across countries. It then follows that market integration should cause valuation
differentials between industries in different countries to converge. We build on this intuition
to create bilateral valuation differentials that serve as our segmentation measure. Specifi-
cally, let EYi,k,t denote industry k’s earnings yield in country i and EYj,k,t the corresponding
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value for the same industry k in country j. Our main variable of analysis is the absolute
value of the difference between the two industry valuations, |EYi,k,t−EYj,k,t|. The weighted
sum of these bilateral industry valuation differentials is our measure of the degree of effective




IWi,j,k,t|EYi,k,t − EYj,k,t|, (1)
where IWi,j,k,t is the relative market capitalization of industry k and N is the number
of industries. The relative market capitalization of a given industry is calculated as the
combined market capitalization of the industry in both countries divided by the combined
market capitalization of all industries in both countries. With this weighting scheme the
industry structure of the country with the larger equity market has more influence on the
segmentation measure.
Note that our measure requires nothing more than industry-level valuation ratios which
are observed at every point in time. This contrasts with the standard approach in the
international finance literature that employs estimated measures of segmentation based on,
for example, the evolution of equity return correlations or systematic risk exposures (e.g.,
world market portfolio betas); see Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang (2009) and the references
therein. However, the construction of such measures requires both historical data and a
particular estimation methodology. Furthermore, the interpretation of these measures often
requires a formal international asset pricing model, about which there is little consensus.
Bekaert et al. (2010) provide a formal derivation of an analogous segmentation measure,
comparing local with global industry valuations. They show that this segmentation measure
can be biased by country-industry differences in leverage and in earnings growth and discount
rate volatilities. In addition, the number of firms in a particular industry should affect the
accuracy of the measure. Finally, the level of the market earnings yield itself may affect
the observed segmentation level, as absolute differences would tend to decrease as earnings
yields themselves becomes smaller. However, it is straightforward to control for these biases
in a regression analysis, which is what we do in this article.
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2.2 A first look at equity market segmentation in Europe
We construct our measure of bilateral valuation differentials, SEG, for a sample of 33 Euro-
pean countries listed in Appendix Table 1, using monthly firm-level data from Datastream
from 1980 to 2007. While we construct monthly SEG measures, most of our subsequent
analysis is at the annual frequency given the availability of other variables. We identify all
local equity securities in these countries covered by Datastream and traded on a public ex-
change. Depository receipts as well as preferred stocks are excluded, as are securities whose
International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) is not local. We then obtain monthly
earnings yield, market capitalization (in USD) as well as USD return data. Datastream
generally reports trailing 12-month earnings yields, where negative yields are set to zero. In
addition, we delete earnings yields that are larger than one. Using Datastream’s industry
classification system,1 we form 38 value-weighted industry portfolios for all countries. For
each country-pair, we compute SEGi,j,t as described in (1). Since our panel data set is
unbalanced, the number of country-pairs is growing over time, reaching the maximum of 521
country-pairs in 2006. Finally, to avoid the influence of possibly mis-measured cross-sectional
outliers, we delete observations with a segmentation measure equal to or larger than the 99th
percentile in a given year.
Figure 1, Panel A presents the time-series of valuation differentials averaged across all
EU country-pairs as well as across non-EU pairs, where a country-pair is classified as an EU
country-pair if at that time both countries are EU members, otherwise a pair is classified as
a non-EU pair. While noisy at the beginning of our sample period, between 1985 and 2007
segmentation has consistently been more pronounced for non-EU country pairs, on average
by about 1.8 percentage points. This time pattern corresponds closely to the efforts of the
European Union since 1983 with respect to capital account liberalization (completed in 1992)
and the harmonization of capital market regulation (still ongoing). With the emergence of
Eastern European countries in the 1990s, the composition of initially non-EU pairs and
later also EU pairs changed substantially. Panel B therefore presents absolute valuation
1Datastream employs the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) framework. For a list of the 38
industries used in our study, see Appendix Table 2. The industry is determined by the source of a firm’s
revenue or the source of the majority of its revenue. Firms that are not classified as one of these 38 industries
are excluded from our study.
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differentials excluding all Eastern European countries. The graph suggests that indeed some
of the observed segmentation is due to the presence of Eastern European countries. However,
even after excluding those, valuation differentials are still on average one percentage point
lower for EU members than for non members between 1985 and 2007.2
While we observe a downward trend in bilateral segmentation, we do not expect that our
measure of bilateral valuation differentials will be zero even under the null of full economic
and financial integration. In order to provide an empirically meaningful benchmark, we use
U.S. equity market data to measure the average level of segmentation for fictitious country-
pairs that mimic our European pairs, but exclusively reflect U.S. valuations. To the extent
that the U.S. is financially and economically integrated, this experiment provides us with a
benchmark to judge whether European country-pairs are segmented or not. In particular,
we identify all U.S. stocks that are covered by CRSP and Compustat. We obtain four
quarter trailing earnings from Compustat and combine these with firm-level equity market
capitalization from CRSP to calculate firm-level earnings yields.3 As in our European data
set, we set negative earning yields to zero and earnings yields larger than unity to missing.
Next, we use these U.S. data to form country-industry portfolios by randomly drawing
firms from the U.S. data set, mimicking the number of firms found in a given country-
industry portfolio in a given year in our European data. We draw from the U.S. sample
with replacement, as the total number of European firms per industry can be larger than the
total number of available U.S. firms.4 We then use these U.S. data based country-industry
portfolios to calculate bilateral segmentation measures as described above. We repeat this
process 500 times and thus obtain a distribution of the average level of bilateral segmentation
to which we can compare the actual level of segmentation observed in Europe as well as in
2In the robustness section of our regression analysis, Section 3.3, we verify that using a balanced sample
for the period 1990 to 2007 we find a significantly negative EU effect of -135 basis points in a difference-in
difference estimation.
3In particular, we obtain “Income Before Extraordinary Items” (IBADJQ) for the previous four quarters.
We pair these earnings with the market value of all outstanding equity securities at the end of December.
We only use earnings data up to the end of September. Using industry information provided by Compustat
(GICS and SIC codes), we assign an ICB code to each firm. For about 3% of all observations, we are unable
to identify the appropriate ICB code.
4In a robustness exercise, we repeat the experiment, but ensure that each country-industry portfolio
contains at least one unique firm. In very few cases, this is impossible as the total number of U.S. firms in a
given industry is smaller than the number of countries. We find that our results are essentially unchanged.
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the European Union.
Figure 2, Panel A shows the average random U.S. benchmark segmentation level from
1980 until 2007, together with a 90% confidence interval. Note that, even though the U.S.
is an integrated market, the level of measured segmentation is mostly in the 2 to 3% range.
Also shown is the average segmentation level for all European countries. With the exception
of 2005, the valuation differentials between European countries are above the 90% confidence
interval of valuation differences in the U.S. Panel B of Figure 2 presents the corresponding
results conditional on EU membership. In contrast to Panel A, a convergence trend is
now apparent. In 2000, the measured segmentation levels across EU countries were similar
to those in the U.S. Since then, segmentation has again been larger across EU members
than in the U.S. It is important to stress that this does not necessarily mean that EU
membership is the cause of integration. For example, a quite plausible alternative hypothesis
is that the general movement towards global market integration leads to narrower valuation
differential across equity markets in the EU. Nevertheless, this still begs the question of why
this convergence is more pronounced for EU countries than for Europe as a whole. In the
next section, we use a regression framework to address this question.
3 The EU and equity market integration
3.1 Benchmark empirical model
In this section, we investigate the effect of EU membership on bilateral equity valuation
differentials, controlling for several potentially confounding factors. The linear regression
model is:
SEGi,j,t = a+ bEUEUi,j,t + bXXi,j,t + ci,j + dt + εi,j,t, (2)
where EUi,j,t is an indicator that is one in year t if both countries are EU members and
zero otherwise, Xi,j,t represents a set of controls, and ci,j and dt represent country-pair and
year fixed effects. All standard errors are robust to arbitrary correlation over time within
country-pairs and across country-pairs within years (see Thompson, 2009; Cameron, Gelbach
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and Miller, 2006; Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004).5 Appendix Table 3 discusses
the data source and construction of all variables used in our analysis and Appendix Table 4
provides summary statistics.
Table 1 reports the result of a regression of all country-pair valuation differentials on
the EU indicator and different sets of controls. The first specification, with only the EU
indicator, shows that absolute valuation differentials are about two percentage points lower
for EU member countries. In specification 2, we add as controls the sum of the number of
firms from both countries (in natural logs) used to calculate the segmentation measure,6 the
average absolute difference in industry leverage, in industry earnings growth volatility, and
in industry return volatility for a given country-pair in a given year. These variables may
cause variation in the SEG-measure unrelated to the degree of integration. Specification 2
also includes the average difference in per capita GDP in 1980 or in 1990 for country pairs
involving Eastern European countries. It is natural to expect that countries with similar
development have similar growth opportunities, and narrower valuation differentials. Given
that EU membership is likely correlated with economic development, this is a potentially
important control variable. One of the main findings in the home bias literature is that
investors tend to invest relatively more in countries that are close by and “familiar” (see
Chan, Covrig and Ng, 2005; Portes and Rey, 2005). To control for such familiarity effects,
we include the distance between the two countries in a country-pair (measured in 1,000
kilometers between the most important cities) as well as a common language indicator as
5Adjusting standard errors for contemporaneous correlation across country-pairs is particularly impor-
tant given that we use a measure of bilateral segmentation. Country-pairs that share one country, for
example Germany and France and France and Italy, are by construction not independent of one an-
other. We account for cross-sectional correlation by calculating the variance of the coefficient estimates











where Wt is the Nt× k matrix of all k right hand side variables for all
Nt country-pairs in year t. To appreciate the importance of accounting for contemporaneous cross-sectional
correlation, consider a regression of the bilateral segmentation measure on the EU indicator (point estimate
-0.0080), including country-pair and year fixed effects. Now compare, for the EU indicator, heteroscedas-
ticity robust standard errors (0.0013) to standard errors that account for contemporaneous cross-sectional
correlation (0.0033) as well as to standard errors that account for contemporaneous cross-sectional corre-
lation and time-series correlation within country pairs (0.0036). We use standard errors that account for
contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation and time-series correlation within country pairs throughout this
study.
6In unreported results, we consider additional controls related to the number of firms used to calculate
the average bilateral industry valuation differential. In particular, we include the minimum as well as the
absolute difference of the number of firms averaged across the relevant industries. We find that the estimated
effect of joint EU membership is unchanged.
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additional controls. Because Eastern European countries are transitioning from the Soviet
era to market-based economies over the course of our sample, we include an Eastern Europe
indicator that is one if at least one country is in Eastern Europe and zero otherwise. Finally,
we must distinguish regional from global integration. We do so by including the earnings
yield differential between the “Core European” countries,7 and the U.S. This differential
should capture integration between the U.S. and Europe and could therefore indirectly affect
valuation differentials across European countries. We also include the market earnings yield
for Core Europe because the variability of earnings yields may be higher at higher yield
levels.
The results for specification 2 indicate that adding these controls is important. The R2
increases from 7 to 19%. Many variables have the expected economic effect and together
substantially reduce the absolute magnitude of the EU membership effect to 0.9%. As
expected, segmentation is negatively associated with the number of firms, and positively
associated with leverage and volatility differences. Economic development differences have
no significant effect on segmentation. The distance between two countries has a positive
and statistically significant effect, suggesting that an additional 1,000 kilometers in distance
increases the valuation differential by 0.4 percentage points. A common language appears to
have little effect on valuation differentials. Eastern European countries are on average less
integrated, yielding a positive and highly significant coefficient estimate of 1.5%. Finally,
as expected, segmentation between European countries is strongly related to segmentation
between Europe and the U.S., reflecting the underlying trend of global market integration.
The effect is economically important, as for every 1% decrease in global segmentation, intra-
European differentials decrease by 1.9%. However, even after controlling for all these factors,
the EU indicator remains statistically and economically significant.
In specification 3, we allow for additional, possibly unobservable time effects by including
year fixed effects. The EU indicator is further reduced to -0.6% but remains statistically
significant, being almost three standard errors from zero. All other coefficients remain largely
unchanged.
7Namely Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom.
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While we have attempted to control for factors that might affect bilateral valuation
differentials as well as EU membership, it remains possible that additional unobservable
characteristics lead to a bias in our coefficient estimates for the EU indicator. To the extent
that these unobservable characteristics are time-invariant, we can address the endogeneity
concern by including country-pair fixed effects (see Glick and Rose (2002) for a similar ap-
plication), essentially identifying the change in segmentation due to a change in membership
status. In specification 4, we reestimate specification 1 augmented by country-pair fixed
effects. Not surprisingly, the R2 increases dramatically (from 7% to 25%), but the EU effect
becomes actually more, not less, important, and is about -2.7%. This strongly suggests that
it is the time series variation in the controls that reduces the magnitude of the EU effect,
not cross-sectional characteristics of the country-pairs. In specification 5, we again add the
controls with time-variation, and the EU effect indeed shrinks to -1.4%, but remains highly
significant. In the last specification, we add year fixed effects to the model, which yields a
difference-in-difference (DID) estimation. As before, the EU effect further declines to -73
basis points, but remains statistically significant.
In sum, we document a strong EU effect on segmentation levels across Europe, which is
robust to country-pair fixed effects, but is reduced in magnitude when we control for time
effects.
To interpret our results in economic terms, we only need to refer to the classic Gordon
growth model. The earnings yield reflects either the cost of equity capital or expected
earnings growth. While we measure absolute differences, EU membership typically reduces
earnings yields towards the levels observed for EU members. Hence, our results indicate
that EU membership is accompanied with a rather sizable reduction in the cost of capital
or an improvement in growth opportunities. It is difficult to compare our findings to other
studies of European equity market integration because most studies do not link their findings
to cost of capital changes. One exception is an article by Hardouvelis, Malliaropulos and
Priestley (2007) that reports a cost of equity decrease between 1 and 2% for several EU
countries adopting the Euro, but no significant reduction for EU countries that do not adopt
the Euro.
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3.2 The EU or the Euro?
Another momentous change in Europe was the introduction of the single currency, the Euro,
in 1999. Most, but not all, EU countries adopted the Euro, with some joining later and
others, such as the UK and Denmark, still holding off. Because Euro adoption is often
viewed as the culmination of the process towards economic and monetary integration within
the EU, it is conceivable that our finding that the EU significantly contributed to equity
market integration is in fact due to the adoption of the Euro, rather than to EU membership
per se.
In fact, there has arguably been more research on the economic effects of Euro adoption
than on the economic effects of EU membership. First, with the Euro area constituting a
currency union, the vast literature on currency unions is relevant here. While the theoretical
literature (Mundell, 1961; Alesina and Barro, 2002) focus on the general economic costs and
benefits of currency unions, starting with Rose (2000), most empirical studies have focused
on trade effects. While most empirical studies have documented increased bilateral trade
associated with currency union membership (see, for example Frankel and Rose, 2002; Glick
and Rose, 2002; Persson, 2001; Barro and Tenreyro, 2007), the exact magnitude of the effect
is the subject of much debate (see Baldwin (2006) for an excellent survey). Studies focussing
on the Euro also fail to agree: Micco, Stein and Ordoñez (2003) document a positive effect
of the Euro on bilateral trade, but Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010) fail to detect an effect.
Second, an active literature focuses of the effects of the Euro on product and labor markets.
For example, Alesina, Ardagna and Galasso (2008) find that the Euro has been associated
with an acceleration of the pace of structural reforms in the product market, but not as
much in the labor market. Finally, there are a number of articles focusing on the financial
effects of the Euro. Bris, Koskinen and Nilsson (2008) show that corporate valuations have
increased in the Euro member countries that previously had weak currencies. They relate
the increase to lower interest rates and lower costs of equity. Hardouvelis et al. (2006, 2007)
estimate a variant of Bekaert and Harvey’s (1995) time-varying degree of integration model,
using European equity market data. The first article claims that Euro adoption served to
integrate European equity markets. The second article documents the aforementioned cost of
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equity decrease of up to 2% in Euro-adopting EU countries between 1992 to 1998. Cappiello,
Kadareja and Manganelli (2010) compare equity return comovements between EU member
states before and after the introduction of the Euro in January 1999. For many country pairs,
especially those that have adopted the Euro, they find an increase in return comovements
after 1998.
While it is possible that our results are related to the introduction of the Euro, it is also
conceivable that EU membership and the move towards global market integration may have
already integrated EU equity markets before the advent of the Euro. By 1999, regional and
global market integration may have moved far enough along for the Euro to have only small
effects. In addition, ex ante we would expect the process of economic market integration
to be more important for equity valuations than the adoption of a single currency. This is
because currency movements account for only a small part of the total variation in equity
returns and the variability of intra-Europe exchange rate changes before 1999 was quite
limited.
In Table 2, Panel A, we add a Euro indicator variable to the various specifications from
Table 1. The Euro indicator takes on the value of one if both countries in a country-pair
are part of the Euro area in a given year and is zero otherwise. In specification 1, where we
only include the EU and the Euro indicator, we find that the adoption of the Euro has an
independent, but smaller negative effect on valuation differentials than EU membership has.
However, when we introduce our control variables (specifications 2 and 3), the Euro effect
disappears. In specification 4, country-pair fixed effects are included and the Euro effect
remains negative, but once we include country-pair and year fixed effects (specification 5),
the Euro effect becomes positive. It appears that it is hard to make a case for a strong Euro
effect on market integration within Europe. Importantly, comparing Table 1 to Table 2, the
EU effect is not at all impacted by the introduction of the Euro indicator.
It is quite conceivable that some of the effects ascribed to the introduction of the Euro in
the literature are simply induced by EU membership. For example, while Hardouvelis et al.
(2006) find that the Euro served to integrate equity markets, their model essentially employs
nominal interest rate differentials to measure the degree of market integration. That the
Euro zone leads to interest rate convergence is beyond dispute, but it seems best not to mix
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the measurement of integration in two different asset markets. Moreover, articles studying
other aspects of integration have also found that the EU generated larger effects than the
Euro. For example, Engel and Rogers (2004) find no tendency for prices to converge after
January 1999, but find a significant reduction in price dispersion throughout the decade of
the 1990s. Goldberg and Verboven (2005) similarly document substantial price convergence
in the EU’s car market throughout the nineties, although absolute price differentials persist
until the end of their sample in 2000. Hence, the EU, not the Euro, led to the integration of
consumer markets.
Note that there may be strong indirect effects of the Euro that are related to the original
mission of the EU. After all, the Maastricht Treaty drafted in 1991 and officially adopted
in November 1993 set out a path of deregulation and rules to culminate in economic and
monetary union and the eventual adoption of the Euro. It is possible that some of the EU
effects we detect are related to changes only occurring in the nineties with the adoption of
the Maastricht Treaty.
In our opinion, the Euro effect should measure the actual effect of the single currency, not
the capital, trade, and labor market integration that may have preceded it. Nevertheless,
we test two additional specifications that change the timing of the Euro effect. First, we
recognize that preparations for the Euro may have been long underway and countries may
have undertaken measures to limit exchange rate volatility some time before the Euro is
actually adopted (for example, by creating a target zone relative to the Euro). In addition,
Frankel (2005) argues that a currency union may already generate effects on trade patterns
before it actually goes into effect, as soon as the negotiations convince the corporate sector
it will actually happen. Fratzscher (2002) claims that European markets have only become
highly integrated since 1996, and that the move to integration was in large part driven by
the drive towards the Euro, and in particular the elimination of exchange rate volatility
and uncertainty in the process of monetary unification. If this is the case, we can test it
directly by replacing the Euro indicator by a measure inversely related to exchange rate
volatility. To do so, we collect bilateral daily exchange rates for all of our countries relative
to the Deutsche Mark before 1999 and relative to the Euro thereafter.8 We use these data
8We do not have daily exchange rate data for Russia in 1997. The total number of observations therefore
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to compute a measure of realized exchange rate volatility, σ (the square root of the sum
of squared daily exchange rate changes during a year). We transform the volatility into a
stability measure on a [0,1] scale by computing 1/ exp(100σ). Thus, a country with zero
exchange rate volatility takes on a value of one (this will be true for all Euro countries once
they adopt the Euro); a country with 12% annual volatility (roughly that of a major floating
currency) would effectively receive a stability measure of zero. For a country-pair, we employ
the average value of the two countries in a pair. In Panel B of Table 2, we show that the
effect associated with this alternative measure based on exchange rate volatility delivers very
similar qualitative findings to the binary Euro indicator. While the stability variable does
indeed move up prior to the introduction of the Euro as exchange rate volatility decreases, the
estimated effect is largely unchanged. Further, the introduction of this alternative indicator
has little impact on the EU indicator, suggesting that the EU effect remains dominant.
In Panel C, we go one step further and bring forward the Euro indicator to 1993 for all
Western European countries adopting the Euro. In other words, the new indicator variable
may already anticipate the effects of monetary union once the Maastricht was officially
adopted. The results suggest a slightly smaller EU effect, and a slightly stronger Euro effect,
but the results of Panel A do not meaningfully change. We conclude that the EU effect on
integration dominates the Euro effect.
3.3 Robustness
So far, we have documented a significantly lower earnings yield differential associated with
EU membership, with the EU effect ranging from -73 to -265 basis points. This reduction in
segmentation is robust to controlling for country-pair and year fixed effects and dominates
the effect of Euro adoption. Here, we discuss a series of robustness checks.
In Panel A of Table 3, we address alternative ways to construct a bilateral segmentation
measure based on industry valuation differentials. Above (see (1)), we defined our segmen-
tation measure as the value-weighted average industry valuation differential. An industry’s
value is the sum of the industry’s equity market capitalization across both countries in a
drops from 6,336 to 6,326.
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country pair. In specifications 1 through 3, we report the EU effect when measuring bilateral
segmentation as the equally weighted average across industries. Specifications 1 through 3
report estimates that correspond to columns 1, 4, and 6 of Table 1. To maintain compara-
bility with the previous results, the sample and regression specification are identical except
for the segmentation measure as well as the control variables related to leverage, earnings
growth volatility, and return volatility having been replaced with their equally weighted
counterparts. While the EU effect in columns 1 and 2 is similar to the one for the value-
weighted segmentation measure, it drops to -0.2% and loses statistical significance once we
add our standard controls as well as country-pair and year fixed effects.
Specifications 4 through 6 use the natural logarithm of the value-weighted segmentation
measure to address its asymmetric distribution as well as potential outliers. We apply the
log transformation to all 6,404 observations, including the top one percentile of observations
that we drop in the construction of our main segmentation measure. We find a negative
and statistically significant effect of EU membership for all specifications. Evaluated at the
average segmentation level of 0.0525, the predicted absolute EU effect on SEG ranges from
-60 basis points (coefficient estimate of -0.1145) to -260 basis points (coefficient estimate of
-0.4932 ), consistent with our previous estimates.
Finally, in the last three specifications of Panel A (rows 7 through 9), we consider a seg-
mentation measure that is constructed as in (1), but where we only include those industries
that contain at least five firms in a country and year. This should improve the precision of
our segmentation measure. The EU effect is again very similar to what we have documented
so far. Even when including country-pair and year fixed effects (specification 9), it is still
associated with a statistically significant (at the 10% level) drop in segmentation of almost
100 basis points.
In Panel B of Table 3, we examine the relationship between equity market segmentation
and EU membership at the monthly frequency. Specifications 1 through 3 report results
using the value-weighted measure as defined in (1), while specifications 4 through 6 report
results for the equally weighted measure as discussed above. In each case, we report the EU
effect for three specifications. The results are very consistent with our findings so far: EU
membership is associated with a significant lower level of equity market segmentation. The
15
effect does become insignificant when using the equally weighted measure and both year and
country-pair fixed effects.
In Table 4, we report several robustness checks on the result that the EU effect dominates
the Euro effect. Panel A summarizes the effect of EU membership as well as Euro adoption
when segmentation is measured in alternative ways. The pattern that emerges is similar
across the different specifications. In specifications without any controls or fixed effects (rows
1, 4, and 7), we observe both significant EU and Euro adoption effects, but segmentation
decreases more in the former case. Once we add country pair fixed effects (rows 2, 5, and
8), the EU effect increases in magnitude, while the Euro effect decreases in magnitude and
generally turns statistically insignificant. Finally with the full set of controls (rows 3, 6,
and 9), the EU effect remains negative and generally marginally significant, while the Euro
effect turns positive. In Panel B, we examine both effects using monthly data, confirming
the results of Panel A.
Finally, we describe the results of two additional robustness exercises. First, we replace
the country-pair fixed effects by the initial segmentation level relative to the EU average.
This variable has the expected positive coefficient, but the EU indicator remains economically
and statistically significant. Second, the unbalanced nature of our panel data set, which
grows over time as additional country-pairs are added to it, may raise concerns (see also
Baldwin (2006)). We therefore also estimate our main difference-in-difference specifications
(specification 6 in Table 1 and specification 5 in Table 2, Panel A) on a balanced sub-sample.
The balanced sub-sample includes 116 country-pairs between 1990 and 2007. We estimate a
significantly negative EU effect of -135 basis points which again is unaltered by the inclusion
of a Euro-Indicator variable that itself has no effect on bilateral equity market segmentation.
3.4 Alternative estimates of the EU effect
So far, we have used country-pair fixed effects to address endogeneity concerns. In this
subsection, we propose and implement an instrumental variables approach that uses a new
and potentially useful instrument for EU membership, namely the distance to Brussels. Much
of the momentum to start, enlarge, and expand the scope of the European Union originated
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in the Benelux countries and France. The governing institutions of the European Union
(EU) are not concentrated in a single capital city; they are instead mostly based across three
cities (Brussels, Luxembourg, and Strasbourg). However, Brussels has become the primary
EU location, hosting a seat of each major institution and now the European Council. It is
possible that EU membership of a given country is negatively correlated with the distance
of a country to Brussels, a clearly exogenous variable.
The procedure for EU accession is lengthy, requiring local connections and information
gathering, and the negotiation process involves countless meetings, taking place, mostly, in
Brussels (see e.g. Nicolaides and Boean, 1996). It is conceivable that shorter distances lead
to a faster accession process. Fischer, Sahay and Gramont (1998), studying the economic
distance between the Eastern European entrants and “Brussels” (their words), also mention
that physical distance should matter but do not elaborate why. The sociology literature on
“localism” offers a different perspective on why the distance to Brussels may promote EU
accession. Berezin and Diez-Medrano (2008) argue that the decision to join the European
Union also depends on popular support for EU membership in the candidate countries.
They then show, using Eurobarometer data, that such local support depends negatively on
the distance to Brussels, a result they interpret as driven by identification with Europe,
trust towards European institutions, and confidence in the ability to influence European
institutions all depending on physical distance. No instrument is perfect, of course, and
while the distance to Brussels is clearly exogenous, it may still correlate with the error
term in the SEG regression through indirect channels. For example, it may be correlated
with the distance between two countries, which we demonstrated affects SEG. Therefore,
the distance between two countries will always be included as a control variable in all IV
specifications.
Since we are interested in predicting the EU membership of a country-pair and since the
distance to Brussels likely differs between the two countries in a country-pair, we propose
the maximum distance to Brussels for a given pair as an instrument for the EU indicator.
Appendix Tables 3 and 4 contain more details on the measure. With 2,905 kilometers,
Cyprus has the largest distance to Brussels in our data set. Table 5 provides evidence on
the usefulness of the proposed instrument. We report the results from a linear probability
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model of the following form:
EUi,j,t = a+ bZZi,j + bXXi,j,t + dt + υi,j,t, (3)
where EUi,j,t represents the EU membership indicator, Zi,j the maximum distance to Brus-
sels for country-pair i, j; Xi,j,t represents control variables from the segmentation model and
dt year fixed effects. We consider three specifications; the first considers just the distance to
Brussels as independent variable; the second adds the control variables and the third replaces
the pure time series controls by year fixed effects. As expected, a longer maximum distance
to Brussels is associated with a lower membership probability for a country-pair, with the
coefficient similar across the specifications and highly significantly different from zero. As
to the other variables, absolute differences in economic development and in financial char-
acteristics, such as leverage and earnings growth and return volatility, lower the probability
of joint EU membership. Membership is also less likely for country-pairs with at least one
Eastern European country and, maybe surprisingly, with a common language. On the other
hand, country pairs with more developed equity markets, as proxied for by the number of
publicly traded firms, as well as, again surprisingly, country pairs that are further apart are
more likely to be EU members. However, the latter effect is not statistically significant.
In addition to the coefficient estimates, we report the adjusted R2, the partial R2 that
reflects the contribution of the proposed instrument, as well as the Wald statistic for the
test bZ = 0. As before, standard errors are robust to arbitrary correlation over time within
country-pairs and across country-pairs within one year. While no critical values exist for
the Wald test statistic in the presence of non-i.i.d. errors, Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest
a value of 10 as a lower boundary to reject weak identification. Specification 1, which only
has the distance to Brussels as a regressor, suggests that our instrument has substantial
predictive power. Specifications 2 and 3, which represent the first stage regressions of the
subsequent IV regressions, confirm that it remains highly significant even after including
our controls from Table 1 as well as year fixed effects. The partial R2 that captures the
contribution of the distance instrument is around 5% and the Wald test statistic is always
substantially larger than the approximate threshold value of 10.
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Using a standard 2SLS setting, Table 6, Panel A presents the effect of EU membership
using the distance to Brussels as an instrument. Specifications 1 and 2 contain the second
stage results corresponding to specifications 2 and 3 of Table 5. We find that EU membership
retains its negative effect on bilateral valuation differentials. Compared to the results in Table
1, the effect is more prominent, but the standard errors also increase, somewhat reducing the
level of significance in the first specification. This suggests that country-pairs with higher
valuation differentials are more likely to become EU members, biasing the results in Table 1
upward.9
These results are robust to the measurement issues explored in Table 3 (detailed results
are available upon request). In addition, we explore a bivariate model which jointly esti-
mates the probability of a country-pair being EU members, using a probit specification, and
the effect of the EU membership on bilateral segmentation. Assuming that the error terms
of both equations, the linear segmentation equation and the non-linear probit model for EU
membership, follow a bivariate normal distribution, we estimate the model via maximum
likelihood estimation. Panel B of Table 6 reports results for the bivariate model. For the
membership equation (column “EU”), we report marginal effects instead of model param-
eters.10 The results for the membership model are qualitatively the same as those from
the linear probability model reported in Table 5. The results for the segmentation model
(column “SEG”) again yield similar results. Segmentation between country-pairs that are
EU members is significantly lower than for non-EU pairs. The EU effect of -260 basis points
is slightly less pronounced than suggested by the corresponding IV regressions. All other
covariates have the expected sign.
3.5 Turkey accession?
One question of considerable debate in Europe is whether and when Turkey should join
the European Union. Since Turkey started accession negotiations in 2005, scores of articles
9Barro and Tenreyro (2007) similarly find that the effect of currency union membership onto trade
increases once they use an IV approach. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) find that the effect of trust on
bilateral trade increases in an IV regression.
10Marginal effects are calculated at the sample mean for continuous variables, but represent a discrete
change for indicator variables.
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and books have discussed the complex cultural, monetary, political, and economic factors
involved. Here, we use our framework to discuss the degree of financial and economic inte-
gration of Turkey within Europe.
Before we turn to regressions, let us first discuss some simple economic development
statistics. In terms of 2007 per capita GDP (measured in USD), Turkey is in the bottom
decile relative to EU member countries, and the lowest ranked country among non-EU coun-
tries in our sample. How segmented is Turkey’s stock market? Table 7 has some preliminary
answers. The first regression has nothing but an EU indicator and a Turkey indicator. The
regression demonstrates that Turkey’s equity market is less segmented compared to other
non-EU countries, on average. Its average bilateral valuation differential between 1992 and
2007 is 1.24% points lower than that of other non-EU country-pairs. Most of this difference
is due to the inclusion of Eastern-European countries. But even in 2007, Turkey is the second
least segmented (after Switzerland) country of the six countries in our sample that still have
not joined the EU. When we control for our usual right hand side variables and year fixed
effects, this coefficient is unchanged.
Taken together, Turkey is clearly not an outlier in terms of market segmentation, but
perhaps that means it has little to gain from EU accession. Of course, our regression pre-
dicts an average EU effect of somewhere between 60 and 330 basis points. Unless we fully
understand the channels through which the effect occurs, it is hard to predict country spe-
cific responses to EU accession and we will not venture such conjectures here. Nevertheless,
the fact that Turkey is among the more integrated non-EU European countries suggests its
benefits may be relatively more limited than the average. Yet, analyses of the economic
benefits for Turkey of joining the EU (see e.g. Flam, 2003; Lejour and Mooij, 2005) typically
conclude that the benefits for Turkey would be large relative to those of other potential
entrants. Of course, we focus on equity market integration, ignoring other economic benefits
of EU membership.
Finally, we can use our linear probability model to compute a theoretical probability
of Turkey joining the European Union. This probability was, in 2007, 40% (without year
fixed effects) and 59% (with year fixed effects). Needless to say, this computation excludes a
number of political factors that may be the dominant drivers of the EU membership decision.
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4 The channels of integration
That EU membership is associated with increased bilateral equity market integration, is in
principle no surprise. Since its original conception in 1957, the EU has promoted the free
movement of goods, services, capital, and people. While the process is far from complete, the
ultimate goal of the EU is to achieve economic and financial integration. Here we explore
whether we can ascribe the observed increase in effective market integration to specific
channels, such as trade integration, or changes in financial market regulation, for example.
The first subsection describes the economic variables we use to measure various potential
channels of integration and tests whether there is indeed an “EU effect” for these variables.
In the second sub-section, we then investigate whether any of these channels can explain the
observed integration effects of EU membership.
Given that we have established that the direct EU effect on financial integration domi-
nates the Euro effect, we focus on the EU effect. In fact, the related literature mostly focuses
on the Euro. For example, a voluminous literature establishes that the Euro has increased
bilateral bond and equity holdings (e.g. Lane, 2006; De Santis and Gérard, 2006; Coeurdacier
and Martin, 2009), cross-border banking activities (Blank and Buch, 2007; Kalemli-Ozcan,
Papaioannou and Peydró, 2010; Spiegel, 2009), and trade (Flam and Nordström, 2007). The
one paper with a similar panel data approach to ours is Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010). They
find that the Euro, but not EU membership, significantly increased cross-border banking
activities, ascribing the effect primarily to the reduction of exchange rate volatility although
increased trade and the adoption of legislative-regulatory harmonization policies in finan-
cial services, required by the EU, also played a role. However, their sample is restricted to
developed countries.
4.1 The effect of EU membership on possible channels of equity
market integration
EU membership must have an independent effect on the variables we propose as measures of
particular integration channels. To test this, Table 8 contains two alternative specifications
for each channel variable we consider. Specification 1 includes a number of country-pair
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time-invariant characteristics that we introduced in the previous section: per capita GDP
differences in 1980/1990; geographic proximity, measured as distance between two countries
(in 1000 km), a common language indicator and an Eastern European country indicator. The
alternative specification is the difference-in-difference (DID) specification with only year and
country-pair fixed effects. Both specifications, of course, also include an EU indicator, which
is the main variable of interest. To conserve space, we do not report the coefficients on
any control variable but focus on the EU effect. We also report the estimated EU effect
as a percentage of the sample mean of the dependent variable. In addition, we mention
the number of observations, as various channel variables are only available for part of our
sample.
4.1.1 Bilateral trade
One of the most obvious channels of integration is trade integration, a primary goal of the EU.
We collect data on country-pair annual trade volume (exports plus imports) from Datastream
and scale it by the average GDP of the two countries in a country-pair. We note that the effect
of increased trade on valuation is perhaps not entirely obvious. Increased trade opportunities
may indeed cause cash flow processes to be more correlated as business cycle transmission
intensifies (Frankel and Rose, 1998), but it may also lead to more specialization. However,
we control for the latter by only comparing earnings yields on an industry-by-industry basis.
In addition, Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) show that trade and financial integration are
positively correlated.
Under the OLS specification, we find that country-pairs inside the European Union have
a trade to GDP ratio that is 37% (0.0041) higher than the sample average of 0.0112. Under
the difference-in-difference specification (DID) specification, with only year and country-pair
fixed effects, the effect of EU membership on bilateral trade is economically smaller (6.7%)
and loses statistical significance.
4.1.2 Financial market integration
Capital market integration should lead to similar discount rates across countries for firms
with similar systematic risks, which we proxy by the industry to which a firm belongs. We
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therefore look both at measures of actual cross-border investment holdings and measures of
changes in regulation. Data on cross-border investments are difficult to find for our sample,
but we examine several imperfect proxies. We collect data on foreign direct investment (FDI)
positions by country-pair from Eurostat, available since 1994. We add the FDI position of
country 1 in country 2 to the FDI position of country 2 in country 1 and scale this sum by
the average GDP of the two countries. The OLS estimation yields a statistically significant
EU effect of 47.5% of the sample mean. The DID estimation on the other hand results in a
negative, but statistically insignificant EU effect.
In unreported results, we have also examined the effect of EU membership on bilateral
portfolio holdings (using data from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey,
available in 1997 and annually since 2001). While the number of observations is substantially
smaller, we again find a significantly positive EU effect in the OLS specification, but not in
the DID estimation.
In addition, we examine direct measures of de jure openness of equity markets and the
capital account. Our measure of equity openness is based upon the the market capitalization
of the S&P investable relative to the S&P global indices in each country, following Bekaert
(1995) and Edison and Warnock (2003). The S&P’s global stock index aims at fully repre-
senting the local stock market whereas the investable index corrects for foreign ownership
restrictions. A ratio of one therefore means that all of the stocks in the local market are avail-
able to foreigners. For capital account openness, we use a component of a new IMF financial
reform index that characterizes the restrictions on a country’s capital account, in the form
of restrictions on the convertibility of the local currency, transaction taxes, or restrictions
on capital flows. We calculate the bilateral average of the capital account openness index
component that takes on values between zero (fully closed) and three (fully liberalized). For
these measures, both the level (openness) and the absolute difference between countries,
indicating (the lack of) regulatory harmonization, are important. So, we investigate both.11
In the simple OLS specification, we find a positive EU effect on the level of capital account
11Because convergence may not necessarily mean convergence to higher levels of integration, we also
investigate a measure that combines both the level and the absolute difference, by investigating the average
level of integration divided by the absolute difference. After dropping observations with relatively small
differences, we find results that are generally consistent with the ones presented in Table 8.
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openness (5.2%) and a negative effect on the absolute difference (-72.5%), both statistically
significant. In the DID estimation, the EU effects are weaker (1.8% and -6.8%) and no
longer statistically significant. For equity market openness (level and difference), we fail to
find significant EU effects in either the OLS or DID specifications.
4.1.3 Other capital market reforms
While cross-border transactions were completely liberalized among EU member states by
the end of 1992, regulatory differences across member countries have remained. It is the
harmonization of regulations, including capital market regulation, that has been the focus
of EU integration efforts over the last 20 years.
Even in the presence of cross-border trade and investments, differences in financial reg-
ulation across countries could lead to differences in industry valuations. To the extent that
EU membership has harmonized financial regulation across member countries, EU mem-
bership should be associated with lower valuation differences. We again use the new IMF
data base that covers credit and security market regulation, interest rate controls, banking
regulation and supervision, capital account restrictions, and privatization for a large set of
countries between 1973 and 2005. Each policy area is evaluated with respect to the amount
of government control or interference and where appropriate the openness to foreigners. The
different categories of financial regulation are summarized in a financial reform index that
takes on values between zero (fully repressed) and 21 (fully liberalized).12 We form bilateral
averages as well as absolute differences in this financial reform index and examine whether
EU membership increases financial reform/liberalization and makes countries more similar
with respect to financial regulation as measured by this new index. In 2005, the average
financial reform index for the European countries in our data set was 19.4, while the average
absolute difference between countries was 1.8.
The results in Table 8 suggest first of all that the EU has significantly increased the index
of financial reform, meaning that country-pairs that are EU members take on index values
between 2.4% (DID) and 10.6% (OLS) above the sample mean. EU membership also led to
12See Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2008) for a detailed discussion of the database. For 2006 and 2007,
we use the values reported for 2005.
24
convergence in financial regulation across member countries, estimated at -39.1% (OLS) and
-8.5% (DID). However, the coefficient in the DID specification is not statistically significant.
We also investigate a number of variables that measure the potential outcome of financial
market reforms. First, reforms may promote stock market development. Bekaert and Harvey
(1995), Levine and Zervos (1998), and Guiso, Jappelli, Padula, Pagano, Martin and Gourin-
chas (2004) document that financial development actually fosters financial integration. We
measure financial development using the fraction of equity market capitalization over GDP.
For each country-pair, we form the equally weighted average of the two fractions as well as
the absolute difference between them. We find a significant EU effect of 22.9% on financial
development in the OLS specification. There is no significant effect in the DID regression.
We do not observe convergence of stock marketer development post EU membership.
Financial market reforms may also have promoted the integration of money markets and
caused real interest rates to converge across countries. Given that the risk-free rate is a
component of the discount rate, differences in real interest rates should be associated with
differences in valuations, thus possibly representing an important channel for EU membership
to affect the segmentation measure. We obtain annual real interest rates from the World
Bank, computed as the prime rate less current inflation as measured by the GDP deflator.
For every country-pair, we calculate the absolute difference between the real interest rates.
Of course, for these countries joining the Euro in 1999, nominal interest rate converged
considerably (see Baele et al., 2004), but this may not necessarily lead to a full integration of
real rates. The OLS and DID results suggest a modest reduction of interest rate differentials
between EU members, but the effect is not statistically significant.
4.1.4 Labor, persons, and information flow
We also examine bilateral data on foreign residents and workers as well as country-pair
specific (business) travel activity. Unfortunately, our data set is much more limited for these
cases, and we fail to find a consistent effect of joint EU membership. Results are available
upon request.
Finally, we conjecture that the EU may have promoted the flow of information across
EU countries. As a proxy, we use the number of telephones (fixed and mobile) per 100
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inhabitants. Again, we investigate both the level and convergence. We find the expected
effects: EU membership increases the number of phones by 31% based on the OLS estimation
and by 3.1% based on the DID estimation. It also leads to convergence in the number of
phones across countries, reducing differences by about 22%. All these effects are statistically
significant at the 5% level.
4.2 The effect of integration channels on valuation differentials
Our above results generally suggest that EU membership has the expected effect on pos-
sible channels of equity market integration. We now examine whether these channels can
explain the EU effect on valuation differentials. We do so by adding these variables to our
segmentation model (see equation (2)), considering again an OLS and a DID specification.
Table 9 reports the results for four different combinations of channels. In addition to the
channel variables listed for each case, we always include the log of the number of listed
firms, the average absolute difference in leverage as well as in industry earnings growth and
return volatility. In addition, the OLS specifications contain: per capita GDP differences
in 1980/1990; geographic proximity, measured as distance between two countries (in 1000
km), a common language indicator, an Eastern European country indicator, the absolute
difference between earning yields in Core Europe and the US as well as the average earnings
yield for Core Europe.
In the first case, we only add the channel variables for which we have the full 6,336
observations available: bilateral trade as well as the average and absolute difference for
equity market openness, MCAP/GDP, and telecommunication. We always show the EU
effect in a regression without the channel variables to contrast how the various channels
reduce the EU effect. In the OLS specification the effect falls by 41.4% from 92 basis points
to 54 basis points, but it remains significant. In the DID specification the effect drops by
24.9% (or about 20 basis points), but it becomes statistically insignificant. The effects of
the channel variables, which we do not report, are typically as expected with negative signs
for trade for example, but not all channel effects are statistically significant.
The other cases in the table each add additional channels to those used in the first case,
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which requires dropping an increasingly larger number of observations (N). In the second
case, the capital account openness and financial reform index measures are added as channel
variables. The EU effect is again reduced, by -17.7% (OLS) and -7.4% (DID), but remains
significant in both specifications.
In the third case, we add FDI positions to the set of channel variables. The FDI effect
has a surprisingly positive effect on segmentation (untabulated). Perhaps large bilateral FDI
positions suggest impediments to portfolio flows. The EU effect is reduced by 33.0% (OLS)
and 36.8% (DID) and becomes insignificant in both specifications.
In the last case, we add the real interest rate differential, which has a positive, but not
significant effect on segmentation. Again, the EU effect becomes smaller by introducing the
various channels, but remains significant in the OLS specification.
The various specifications with different sample sizes show that the proposed channels
reduce the EU effect in all cases, without completely accounting for it. That is, while EU
membership is associated with more cross-border trade and investment, harmonized financial
regulation and greater capital account openness, as well as deeper financial development,
smaller interest rate differences, and more information flow, these channels do not completely
drive out the EU effect. It is possible that there is an EU effect that is larger than the “sum of
the parts”. Alternatively, we are simply missing a few important channels, or measurement
error in the channel variables we do use prevent them from fully driving out the EU effect.
5 Conclusions
We provide a new perspective on measuring equity market integration in the EU. Our mea-
sure is essentially model free and is based on industry earnings yield differences. In an
integrated market, these yields should converge. Using a large panel data set of bilateral
measures of equity market segmentation, we document that earnings yield differences are be-
tween 60 and 330 basis points lower if both countries are EU members. This finding is robust
to various country-pair characteristics and global market integration trends. The indepen-
dent EU effect survives in an instrumental variables analysis, where we use the distance to
Brussels as an instrument for EU membership. We examine several channels through which
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EU membership could affect equity market integration. While we find that EU membership
typically has the predicted effect on these channels of integration, they cannot fully account
for the EU effect. While a number of interpretations are possible, it is conceivable that there
is an independent EU effect that cannot be attributed to a particular measurable channel.
The adoption of the Euro generates a much smaller integration effect that has no impact on
the economically and statistically much stronger effect of EU membership.
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1980 - 2007 (N  = 6,336)
1 2 3 4 5 6
EU - Indicator -0.0203 -0.0092 -0.0059 -0.0265 -0.0138 -0.0073
(0.0036) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0036)
Sum of Number of Listed Firms (ln) -0.0030 -0.0039 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0035) (0.0032)
Abs. Diff. in Leverage 0.0491 0.0576 0.0174 0.0361
(0.0207) (0.0187) (0.0302) (0.0233)
Abs. Diff. in Ln Earnings Growth Volatility 0.0549 0.0702 0.0412 0.0616
(0.0311) (0.0310) (0.0237) (0.0217)
Abs. Diff. in Return Volatility 0.1539 0.1241 0.3768 0.2625
(0.0731) (0.0672) (0.1234) (0.1138)
Abs. Diff. in PC GDP in 1980/1990 (in 1,000 USD) 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Distance (in 1,000 km) 0.0037 0.0042
(0.0013) (0.0012)
Common Language Indicator -0.0004 -0.0001
(0.0035) (0.0033)
Eastern Europe Indicator 0.0155 0.0165
(0.0048) (0.0052)
Abs. EY - Differential: Core Europe vs. USA 1.8529 1.8307
(0.3303) (0.3294)
Core Europe - Earnings Yield -0.0754 -0.0018
(0.2656) (0.2519)
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Country-pair Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R 2 0.07 0.19 0.26 0.25 0.34 0.40
Table 1 reports coefficient estimates and standard errors for linear regression models of pairwise segmentation. All variables are 
defined in Appendix Table 3.  All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and to arbitrary correlation across country-pairs 
in a given year as well as across years for a given country-pair. Specifications 3 and 6 contain year fixed effects and 
specifications 4, 5, and 6 contain country-pair fixed effects. Coefficient estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level 
appear in bold. N denotes the number of observations.   
Table 2
Pairwise Segmentation, the EU, and the Euro
1980 - 2007
Panel A: The Euro (N  = 6,336)
1 2 3 4 5
EU - Indicator -0.0187 -0.0093 -0.0057 -0.0256 -0.0072
(0.0037) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0038) (0.0036)
Euro - Indicator -0.0088 0.0001 -0.0013 -0.0082 0.0057
(0.0026) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0044) (0.0032)
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes
Country-pair Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
Adj. R 2 0.08 0.19 0.26 0.25 0.41
Panel B: Exchange Rate Stability (N  = 6,236)
1 2 3 4 5
EU - Indicator -0.0188 -0.0096 -0.0062 -0.0235 -0.0073
(0.0038) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0042) (0.0037)
Exchange Rate Stability Indicator -0.0062 0.0018 0.0019 -0.0143 0.0064
(0.0035) (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0060) (0.0066)
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes
Country-pair Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
Adj. R 2 0.07 0.19 0.26 0.25 0.40
Panel C: Aniticipated Euro Introduction (N  = 6,336)
1 2 3 4 5
EU - Indicator -0.0172 -0.0086 -0.0054 -0.0242 -0.0074
(0.0036) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0037) (0.0036)
Euro - Indicator (starting in 1993) -0.0108 -0.0030 -0.0024 -0.0194 0.0033
(0.0026) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0063) (0.0036)
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes
Country-pair Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
Adj. R 2 0.08 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.41
Table 2 reports coefficient estimates and standard errors for linear regression models of pairwise 
segmentation. The Exchange Rate Stability Indicator is based on a transformed measure of realized volatility 
A country with zero exchange rate volatility (relative to the Deutsch Mark / Euro) takes on a value of one; a 
country with 1% monthly volatility (roughly that of a major floating currency) would effectively receive a zero. 
For a country-pair, we employ the average value of the two countries in a pair. The Euro – Indicator (starting 
in 1993) equals one from 1993 onwards if both countries in a country-pair introduce the Euro before 2005. For 
Euro adoptions in 2005 or later, the indicator is one from the year of Euro adoption onward. It is zero in all 
other cases. All variables are defined in Appendix Table 3.  All standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and to arbitrary correlation across country-pairs in a given year as well as across years for 
a given country-pair. In each panel, specifications 2, 3 and 5 contain the same control variables as in Table 1, 
specifications 3 and 4 contain year fixed effects and specifications 4 and 5 contain country-pair fixed effects. 
Coefficient estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level appear in bold. N denotes the number of 
observations.   
 
Table 3
Robustness of the EU Effect
1980 - 2007
Panel A: Alternative Constructions of the Segmentation Measure
No.
Segmentation 




Effects N Adj. R 2
1 Equally Weighted -0.0190 No No No 6,336 0.06
(0.0044)
2 Equally Weighted -0.0241 No No Yes 6,336 0.34
(0.0038)
3 Equally Weighted -0.0020 Yes Yes Yes 6,336 0.51
(0.0036)
4 ln (SEG) -0.3325 No No No 6,404 0.07
(0.0544)
5 ln (SEG) -0.4621 No No Yes 6,404 0.27
(0.0643)
6 ln (SEG) -0.1145 Yes Yes Yes 6,404 0.43
(0.0561)
7 At least five Firms -0.0183 No No No 4,491 0.04
(0.0032)
8 At least five Firms -0.0240 No No Yes 4,491 0.20
(0.0045)
9 At least five Firms -0.0098 Yes Yes Yes 4,491 0.32
(0.0052)
Panel B: Monthly Frequency
No.
Segmentation 




Effects N Adj. R 2
1 Value-Weighted -0.0217 No No No 74,429 0.07
(0.0018)
2 Value-Weighted -0.0272 No No Yes 74,429 0.30
(0.0017)
3 Value-Weighted -0.0059 Yes Yes Yes 74,429 0.44
(0.0021)
5 Equally Weighted -0.0204 No No No 74,429 0.07
(0.0021)
6 Equally Weighted -0.0246 No No Yes 74,429 0.37
(0.0018)
7 Equally Weighted -0.0015 Yes Yes Yes 74,429 0.53
(0.0021)
Table 3 reports coefficient estimates and standard errors for linear regression models of pairwise segmentation. 
Panel A examines alternative constructions of the pairwise segmentation measure: using an equally weighted 
average of absolute industry valuation differences, the natural log of the main segmentation measure as well as a 
measure for whose construction all industries with less than five firms per country and year have been excluded. 
Panel B provides results when measuring segmentation at the monthly frequency; right hand side variables are at 
the annual frequency, except for “Abs. Diff. in Ln Earnings Growth Volatility” (quarterly frequency) and “Abs. Diff. 
in Return Volatility” (monthly frequency). Control variables, if included, are the same as in Table 1. All variables 
are defined in Appendix Table 3.  All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and to arbitrary correlation 
across country-pairs in a given year (Panel A) or year-month (Panel B) as well as across years (Panel A) or year-
months (Panel B) for a given country-pair. Coefficient estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level 
appear in bold. N denotes the number of observations.   
Table 4
The EU and the Euro: Robustness
1980 - 2007
Panel A: Alternative Constructions of the Segmentation Measure
No.
Segmentation 




Effects N Adj. R 2
1 Equally Weighted -0.0173 -0.0093 No No No 6,336 0.07
(0.0046) (0.0038)
2 Equally Weighted -0.0235 -0.0054 No No Yes 6,336 0.35
(0.0038) (0.0050)
3 Equally Weighted -0.0020 0.0018 Yes Yes Yes 6,336 0.51
(0.0036) (0.0032)
4 ln (SEG) -0.2989 -0.1918 No No No 6,404 0.07
(0.0599) (0.0618)
5 ln (SEG) -0.4429 -0.1799 No No Yes 6,404 0.27
(0.0641) (0.0932)
6 ln (SEG) -0.1133 0.1052 Yes Yes Yes 6,404 0.44
(0.0559) (0.0652)
7 At least five Firms -0.0159 -0.0111 No No No 4,491 0.05
(0.0037) (0.0031)
8 At least five Firms -0.0226 -0.0083 No No Yes 4,491 0.20
(0.0044) (0.0041)
9 At least five Firms -0.0098 0.0107 Yes Yes Yes 4,491 0.32
(0.0053) (0.0051)
Panel B: Monthly Frequency
No.
Segmentation 




Effects N Adj. R 2
1 Value-Weighted -0.0201 -0.0086 No No No 74,429 0.08
(0.0019) (0.0014)
2 Value-Weighted -0.0264 -0.0074 No No Yes 74,429 0.30
(0.0017) (0.0020)
3 Value-Weighted -0.0059 0.0041 Yes Yes Yes 74,429 0.44
(0.0021) (0.0020)
4 Equally Weighted -0.0188 -0.0089 No No No 74,429 0.07
(0.0022) (0.0019)
5 Equally Weighted -0.0241 -0.0049 No No Yes 74,429 0.37
(0.0018) (0.0023)
6 Equally Weighted -0.0015 0.0007 Yes Yes Yes 74,429 0.53
(0.0021) (0.0020)
Table 4 reports coefficient estimates and standard errors for linear regression models of pairwise segmentation. Panel A examines 
alternative constructions of the pairwise segmentation measure: using an equally weighted average of absolute industry valuation 
differences, the natural log of the main segmentation measure, as well as a measure for whose construction all industries with less 
than five firms per country and year have been excluded. Panel B provides results when measuring segmentation at the monthly 
frequency; right hand side variables are at the annual frequency, except for “Abs. Diff. in Ln Earnings Growth Volatility” (quarterly 
frequency) and “Abs. Diff. in Return Volatility” (monthly frequency). Control variables, if included, are the same as in Table 1. All 
variables are defined in Appendix Table 3.  All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and to arbitrary correlation across 
country-pairs in a given year (Panel A) or year-month (Panel B) as well as across years (Panel A) or year-months (Panel B) for a 
given country-pair. Coefficient estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level appear in bold. N denotes the number of 
observations.   
Table 5
Predicting EU Membership
1980 - 2007 (N  = 6,336)
1 2 3
Distance to Brussels (in 1000 km) -0.1847 -0.1973 -0.2111
(0.0332) (0.0278) (0.0284)
Sum of Number of Listed Firms (ln) 0.0405 0.0545
(0.0132) (0.0132)
Abs. Diff. in Leverage -1.1737 -1.0416
(0.4290) (0.3765)
Abs. Diff. in Ln Earnings Growth Volatility -0.4225 -0.5752
(0.2203) (0.2170)
Abs. Diff. in Return Volatility -4.6979 -4.1564
(1.0159) (1.0298)
Abs. Diff. in PC GDP in 1980/1990 (in 1,000 USD) -0.0169 -0.0177
(0.0023) (0.0023)
Distance (in 1,000 km) 0.0459 0.0421
(0.0240) (0.0244)
Common Language Indicator -0.1896 -0.1956
(0.0883) (0.0868)
Eastern Europe Indicator -0.2057 -0.2344
(0.0825) (0.0815)
Abs. EY - Differential: Core Europe vs. USA -21.7800
(3.7780)
Core Europe - Earnings Yield 5.5875
(2.3478)
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes
Adj. R 2 0.06 0.30 0.36
Partial R 2 0.06 0.04 0.05
Wald test statistic for effect of instrument 30.91 50.33 55.29
Table 2 reports coefficient estimates and standard errors for linear probability models of pairwise 
EU membership. The dependent variable is one if both countries in a country-pair are EU 
members in a given year and zero otherwise. All variables are defined in Appendix Table 3.  All 
standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and to arbitrary correlation across country-pairs 
in a given year as well as across years for a given country-pair. Specification 3 contains year 
fixed effects. Coefficient estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level appear in bold. 
N denotes the number of observations. The partial R2 reflects the contribution of the proposed 
instrument and the Wald statistic refers to the test that the coefficient of the instrument is zero.   
Table 6
Alternative Identifications
1980 - 2007 (N  = 6,336)
Panel A: Instrumental Variable Regression Panel B: Bivariate Model
1 2 EU SEG
EU - Indicator -0.0324 -0.0333 Distance to Brussels (in 1000 km) -0.3077
(0.0173) (0.0167) (0.0473)
Sum of Number of Listed Firms (ln) -0.0019 -0.0021 EU - Indicator -0.0260
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0058)
Abs. Diff. in Leverage 0.0275 0.0363 Sum of Number of Listed Firms (ln) 0.0850 -0.0026
(0.0191) (0.0183) (0.0204) (0.0009)
Abs. Diff. in Ln Earnings Growth Volatility 0.0417 0.0508 Abs. Diff. in Leverage -1.5946 0.0420
(0.0288) (0.0288) (0.5974) (0.0136)
Abs. Diff. in Return Volatility 0.0212 -0.0213 Abs. Diff. in Ln Earnings Growth Volatility -0.8475 0.0560
(0.1258) (0.1160) (0.3526) (0.0297)
Abs. Diff. in PC GDP in 1980/1990 (in 1,000 USD) -0.0004 -0.0004 Abs. Diff. in Return Volatility -6.7615 0.0178
(0.0004) (0.0004) (1.5696) (0.0678)
Distance (in 1,000 km) 0.0023 0.0023 Abs. Diff. in PC GDP in 1980/1990 (in 1,000 USD) -0.0282 -0.0003
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0044) (0.0002)
Common Language Indicator -0.0045 -0.0051 Distance (in 1,000 km) 0.0789 0.0028
(0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0338) (0.0009)
Eastern Europe Indicator 0.0102 0.0096 Common Language Indicator -0.2286 -0.0037
(0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0846) (0.0020)
Abs. EY - Differential: Core Europe vs. USA 1.3998 Eastern Europe Indicator -0.2880 0.0115
(0.4096) (0.1135) (0.0032)
Core Europe - Earnings Yield 0.0553
(0.2123)
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes
Table 6 reports coefficient estimates and standard errors for instrumental variable regressions of pairwise segmentation (Panel A) and for a bivariate model of pairwise EU 
membership (column “EU”) and segmentation (column “SEG”). In Panel B, estimates for EU membership (column “EU”) represent marginal effects from a probit model 
that is jointly estimated with the segmentation equation. Marginal effects are calculated at the sample mean for continuous variables, but represent a discrete change for 
indicator variables.  All variables are defined in Appendix Table 3.  All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and to arbitrary correlation across country-pairs in a 
given year as well as across years for a given country-pair. Specification 2 of Panel A contains year fixed effects. Coefficient estimates that are statistically significant at 
the 5% level appear in bold.  N denotes the number of observations.  
Table 7
EU and Turkey: Segmentation
1992 - 2007 (N  = 5,429)
1 2
EU - Indicator -0.0243 -0.0081
(0.0046) (0.0022)
Turkey Indicator -0.0124 -0.0124
(0.0046) (0.0044)
Sum of number of listed firms (ln) -0.0032
(0.0010)
Abs. Diff. in Leverage 0.0545
(0.0197)
Abs. Diff. in Ln Earnings Growth Volatility 0.0722
(0.0349)
Abs. Diff. in Return Volatility 0.2316
(0.0802)
Abs. Diff. in PC GDP in 1980/1990 (in 1,000 USD) 0.0000
(0.0002)
Distance (in 1,000 km) 0.0043
(0.0013)
Common Language Indicator 0.0040
(0.0033)
Eastern Europe Indicator 0.0158
(0.0049)
Year Fixed Effects No Yes
Adj. R 2 0.10 0.23
Table 7 reports coefficient estimates and standard errors for linear regression 
models of pairwise segmentation between 1992 and 2007. The Turkey Indicator 
takes on values of one for country-pairs including Turkey and zero otherwise. All 
other variables are defined in Appendix Table 3.  All standard errors are robust 
to heteroskedasticity and to arbitrary correlation across country-pairs in a given 
year as well as across years for a given country-pair. Specification 2 contains 
year fixed effects. Coefficient estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% 
level appear in bold. N denotes the number of observations.   
Table 8
EU and Possible Channels of Integration
OLS and DID Estimations
Channel N OLS DID OLS DID
Trade
Trade 6,336 0.0041 0.0008 37.0% 6.7%
(0.0013) (0.0005)
Capital Markets
FDI 4,085 0.0059 -0.0031 47.5% -24.8%
(0.0020) (0.0017)
Capital Account Openness: Average 4,817 0.1468 0.0501 5.2% 1.8%
(0.0469) (0.0580)
Capital Account Openness: Difference 4,817 -0.1897 -0.0177 -72.5% -6.8%
(0.0508) (0.0923)
Equity Market Openness: Average 6,336 0.0270 0.0080 3.3% 1.0%
(0.0166) (0.0077)
Equity Market Openness: Difference 6,336 0.0037 -0.0126 1.3% -4.5%
(0.0263) (0.0121)
Financial Reform: Average 4,817 1.8999 0.4287 10.6% 2.4%
(0.2306) (0.1938)
Financial Reform: Difference 4,817 -1.0323 -0.2239 -39.1% -8.5%
(0.1805) (0.2716)
MCAP/GDP: Average 6,336 0.1393 -0.0464 22.9% -7.6%
(0.0372) (0.0245)
MCAP/GDP: Difference 6,336 0.0547 -0.0288 10.4% -5.5%
(0.0410) (0.0282)
Absolute Real Interest Differential 4,048 -0.0068 -0.0033 -18.0% -8.8%
(0.0036) (0.0042)
Information Flow
Telecommunication: Average 6,336 0.3031 0.0308 31.0% 3.1%
(0.0294) (0.0114)
Telecommunication: Difference 6,336 -0.0632 -0.0613 -22.9% -22.3%
(0.0170) (0.0189)
EU - Indicator Implied Change
(in % of sample mean)
Table 8 reports coefficient estimates and standard errors for the effect of EU membership onto the left hand 
side variable listed under “Channel”. We report results from two separate estimations: Ordinary least squares 
regressions (OLS) and difference-in-difference estimations (DID). In addition to the EU indicator variable, we 
include in all OLS specifications: Abs. Diff. in PC GDP in 1980/1990, Distance (in 1000 km), Common 
Language Indicator, Eastern Europe Indicator. The DID specifications contain year and country-pair fixed 
effects. We also report the EU effect as a percentage of the sample means (see Appendix Table 4).  All 
variables are defined in Appendix Table 3.  All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and to arbitrary 
correlation across country-pairs in a given year as well as across years for a given country-pair. Coefficient 
estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level appear in bold. Coefficient estimates that are 
statistically significant at the 5% level appear in bold. N denotes the number of observations.   
Table 9
Pairwise Segmentation and the EU: Channels








1 6,336 OLS -0.0092 Trade, Equity Market, MCAP/GDP, Telecommunication -0.0054 -41.4%
(0.0022) (0.0020)
DID -0.0073 -0.0055 -24.9%
(0.0036) (0.0037)
2 4,817 OLS -0.0128 Trade, Equity Market, MCAP/GDP, Telecommunication, -0.0106 -17.7%
(0.0021) Capital Account Openness, Financial Reform (0.0023)
DID -0.0095 -0.0088 -7.4%
(0.0036) (0.0041)
3 4,085 OLS -0.0057 Trade, Equity Market, MCAP/GDP, Telecommunication, -0.0038 -33.0%
(0.0021) FDI (0.0024)
DID -0.0115 -0.0073 -36.8%
(0.0051) (0.0047)
4 4,048 OLS -0.0139 Trade, Equity Market, MCAP/GDP, Telecommunication, -0.0108 -22.3%
(0.0023) Absolute Real Interest Differential (0.0022)
DID -0.0080 -0.0060 -24.7%
(0.0053) (0.0057)
Table 9 reports coefficient estimates and standard errors for regression models of pairwise segmentation. In each case, we report 
results from ordinary least squares (OLS) and difference-in-difference (DID) models. All specifications include: Sum of Number of 
Listed Firms (ln), Abs. Diff. in Leverage, Abs. Diff. in Ln Earnings Growth Volatility, Abs. Diff. in Return Volatility. The OLS 
specifications also include: Abs. Diff. in PC GDP in 1980/1990, Distance (in 1000 km), Common Language Indicator, Eastern Europe 
Indicator, Abs. EY - Differential: Core Europe vs. USA, Core Europe - Earnings Yield.  The DID specifications also contain country-pair 
and year fixed effects. For each model, we first report the coefficient estimate of the EU-Indicator when the Channel variables are 
excluded. We then report the coefficient estimate of the EU-Indicator, when the listed Channel variables are included. Where 
applicable, both the average value and the absolute difference of the channel variable are included. We also report the relative change 
of the coefficient estimate of the EU-Indicator. All variables are defined in Appendix Table 3.  All standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and to arbitrary correlation across country-pairs in a given year as well as across years for a given country-pair. 
Coefficient estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level appear in bold. N denotes the number of observations.   
Figure 1
Pair-wise Segmentation over Time
1980 - 2007
Panel A: EU vs. Non-EU Country Pairs


































































































Panel A: All European Country Pairs


































































































All EU Member Pairs
Appendix Table 1











Austria AUT 1980 2007 1995 1999
Belgium BEL 1980 2007 X 1957 1999
Bulgaria BGR 2003 2007 X 2007 -
Croatia HRV 1999 2007 X - -
Cyprus CYP 1995 2007 2004 -
Czech Republic CZE 1995 2007 X 2004 -
Denmark DNK 1980 2007 X 1973 -
Estonia EST 2000 2007 X 2004 -
Finland FIN 1989 2007 1995 1999
France FRA 1980 2007 X 1957 1999
Germany DEU 1980 2007 X 1957 1999
Greece GRC 1990 2007 1981 2001
Hungary HUN 1993 2007 X 2004 -
Iceland ISL 2005 2007 - -
Ireland IRL 1980 2007 X 1973 1999
Italy ITA 1980 2007 X 1957 1999
Latvia LVA 2000 2007 X 2004 -
Lithuania LTU 2001 2007 X 2004 -
Luxembourg LUX 1991 2007 X 1957 -
Malta MLT 2002 2007 2004 -
Netherlands NLD 1980 2007 X 1957 1999
Norway NOR 1980 2007 - -
Poland POL 1994 2007 X 2004 -
Portugal PRT 1990 2007 1986 1999
Romania ROM 2000 2007 X 2007 -
Russian Federation RUS 1997 2007 X - -
Slovak Republic SVK 2001 2007 X 2004 -
Slovenia SVN 2001 2007 X 2004 2007
Spain ESP 1988 2007 1986 1999
Sweden SWE 1980 2007 1995 -
Switzerland CHE 1980 2007 - -
Turkey TUR 1992 2007 - -
United Kingdom GBR 1980 2007 X 1973 -
Total countries 33 9 12 27 12
Total distinct country pairs 528 351 66




ICB - Code DS - Code Industry Name
530 OILGP Oil & Gas Producers
570 OILES Oil Equipment & Services
580 ALTEN Alternative Energy
1350 CHMCL Chemicals
1730 FSTPA Forestry & Paper
1750 INDMT Industrial Metals & Mining
1770 MNING Mining
2350 CNSTM Construction & Materials
2710 AERSP Aerospace & Defense
2720 GNIND General Industrials
2730 ELTNC Electronic & Electrical Equipment
2750 INDEN Industrial Engineering
2770 INDTR Industrial Transportation
2790 SUPSV Support Services
3350 AUTMB Automobiles & Parts
3530 BEVES Beverages
3570 FOODS Food Producers
3720 HHOLD Household Goods & Home Construction
3740 LEISG Leisure Goods
3760 PERSG Personal Goods
3780 TOBAC Tobacco
4530 HCEQS Health Care Equipment & Services
4570 PHARM Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
5330 FDRGR Food & Drug Retailers
5370 GNRET General Retailers
5550 MEDIA Media
5750 TRLES Travel & Leisure
6530 TELFL Fixed Line Telecommunications
6570 TELMB Mobile Telecommunications
7530 ELECT Electricity
7570 GWMUT Gas, Water & Multiutilities
8350 BANKS Banks
8530 NLINS Nonlife Insurance
8570 LFINS Life Insurance
8730 RLISV Real Estate Investment & Services
8770 FNSVS Financial Services
9530 SFTCS Software & Computer Services




Pairwise Segmentation Average of the absolute difference between industry earnings yields in 
country A and country B, weighted by the sum of the industry market 
capitalization in country A and country B. Source: Datastream.
EU and Euro Indicators
EU - Indicator Indicator equals one if both countries are members of the EU in a given 
year.
Euro - Indicator Indicator equals one if both countries in a country-pair are part of the Euro 
area in a given year. Zero of all country-pairs before 1999.
Euro - Indicator (starting in 1993) Indicator equals one from 1993 onwards if both countries in a country-pair 
have introduced the Euro before 2005. For Euro adoptions in 2005 or later, 
the indicator is one from the year of Euro adoption onward. The indicator is 
zero in all other cases.
Exchange Rate Volatility Indicator Using daily exchange rates for the Deutsche Mark until 1998 and for the 
Euro afterwards, we compute a measure of the realized exchange rate 
volatility, σ  (the square root of the sum of squared daily exchange rate 
changes during a year) for all countries and years (with the exception of 
Russin in 1997). We transform the realized volatility onto a [0,1] scale by 
computing 1/exp(1200 σ ).  Thus, a country with zero exchange rate 
volatility takes on a value of one; a country with 1% monthly volatility 
(roughly that of a major floating currency) would effectively receive a zero. 
For a country-pair, we employ the average value of the two countries in a 
pair.
Distance to Brussels (in 1000 km) For the most important city/agglomeration (as of 2004) in every country  in 
our data set, we obtain the distance (in thousand of kilometers) to Brussels. 
With the exception of Germany, the most important city is the capital city. 
For a country-pair, we use the maximum of the two distances as our 
country-pair measure of distance to Brussels. Source: CEPII.
Measure induced Controls
Sum of number of listed firms (ln) Natural log of the total number of listed firms in A and B used in 
construction of the bilateral segmentation measure. Source: Datastream.
Abs. Diff. in Leverage We obtain annual accounting data for all public firms contained in Bureau 
van Dijk's OSIRIS data base. For industrial firms, we define financial 
leverage as the ratio of long term interest bearing debt to total assets. For 
financial firms, we define financial leverage as the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets. Weighting each observation by total assets, we aggregate this 
ratio across all firms per industry, country and year. Since coverage is 
limited in time and across industries and countries, we use linear 
regressions based on country dummies, industry dummies, private credit 
over GDP as well as industry return volatility to predict industry leverage 
when leverage data are not available. We then take the absolute difference 
between industry leverage in country A and country B. Finally, for each 
country-pair and year we average this absolute leverge difference across 
all industries using the sum of an industry's market values in both countries 
as the weight. 
Variable Description
Abs. Diff. in Ln Earnings Growth Volatility We measure industry log earnings growth volatility by calculating the five-
year standard deviation of quarterly log growth rates of 12-month earnings 
(measured in USD) for all industries in a given country.  We require at least 
eight quarters of data for the calculation.  We then form the weighted 
average of the absolute difference between the industry log earnings 
growth volatility in country A and country B,  where we use industry market 
values as weights. 
Abs. Diff. in Return Volatility We measure industry log return volatility by calculating the five-year 
standard deviation of monthly industry log returns (measured in USD) for 
all industries in a given country.  We require at least 24 months of data for 
the calculation.  We then form the weighted average of the absolute 
difference between the industry return volatility in country A and country B,  
where we use industry market values as weights. 
Similiarity and Proximity (time-invariant)
Abs. Diff. in PC GDP in 1980/1990 (in 1,000 
USD)
The absolute difference in per capita GDP (measured in constant USD) 
between two countries in a country-pair in 1980, or if not available in 1990.
Distance (in 1,000 km) Distance between the most important cities/agglomerations (in terms of 
population) in thousands of kilometers. Source: CEPII.
Common Language Indicator Indicator equals one if the two countries in a country-pair share a common 
official language. Source: CEPII.
Eastern Europe Indicator Indicator equals one if at least one of the two countries in a country-pair is 
an Eastern European country. See Appendix Table 1 for a list of Eastern 
European countries. 
Time-Series Controls
Abs. EY - Differential: Core Europe vs. USA The average absolute difference between industry earning yields in Core 
Europe and the US. We obtain earnings yields for Core Europe by 
aggregating all industries across Core European countries. See Appendix 
Table1 for a list of Core European countries. Source: Datastream
Core Europe - Earnings Yield The earning yield in Core Europe. We obtain earnings yields for Core 
Europe by aggregating all Core European countries. See Appendix Table1 
for a list of Core European countries. Source: Datastream
Potential Channels of Integration
Trade Total of exports and imports between two countries in a country-pair, 
scaled by average GDP. Source: Datastream and WDI
FDI Total of FDI holdings of country one in country tow plus those of country 
two in country one scaled by average GDP. Source: Eurostat and WDI
Capital Account Openness: Average The average level of captial account regulation across the two countries in 
a country-pair. The variable takes on values between zero (closed) and 
three (fully liberalized). Source: IMF
Capital Account Openness: Difference The absolute difference in the level of capital account regulation between 
the two countries in a country-pair. Source: IMF
Variable Description
Equity Market Openness: Average The average of measured equity market openness across the two 
countries in a country-pair. Equity market openness is measured as the 
ratio of the market capitalization of the constituent firms comprising the IFC 
Investable index to those that comprise the IFC Global index for each 
country.  The IFC Global index, subject to some exclusion restrictions, is 
designed to represent the overall market portfolio for each country, 
whereas the IFC Investable index is designed to represent a portfolio of 
domestic equities that are available to foreign investors.  A ratio of one 
means that all of the stocks are available to foreign investors.  Fully 
segmented countries have an intensity measure of zero, and fully 
liberalized countries have an intensity measure of one. 
Equity Market Openness: Difference The absolute difference in equity market openness between the two 
countries in a country-pair. 
Financial Reform: Average The average of the financial refrom index across the two countries in a 
country-pair. The index takes on values between zero (fully repressed) and 
21 (fully liberalized). Source: IMF
Financial Reform: Difference The absolute difference in the financial refrom index between the two 
countries in a country-pair. Source: IMF
MCAP/GDP: Average The average ratio of equity market capitalization to GDP across the two 
countries in a country-pair. Source: WDI
MCAP/GDP: Difference The absolute difference in the "equity market capitalization to GDP" ratio 
between the two countries in a country-pair. Source: WDI
Absolute Real Interest Differential The absolute difference between the real interest rate in the two countries 
in a country pair. The real interest rate is measured as the prime rate less 
inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. Source: WDI
Telecommunication: Average The average of the ratio "number of fixed lines and mobile phone 
subscribers per 100 people" across the two countries in a country-pair. 
Source: WDI
Telecommunication: Difference The absolute difference in the ratio "number of fixed lines and mobile 




Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pairwise Segmentation 6,336 0.0525 0.0374 0.0000 0.3506
EU - Indicator 6,336 0.4337 0.4956 0.0000 1.0000
Euro - Indicator 6,336 0.0767 0.2661 0.0000 1.0000
Euro - Indicator (starting in 1993) 6,336 0.1316 0.3381 0.0000 1.0000
Exchange Rate Volatility Indicator 6,326 0.2936 0.3282 0.0000 1.0000
Distance to Brussels (in 1000 km) 6,336 1.4565 0.6300 0.1730 2.9050
Sum of number of listed firms (ln) 6,336 5.2742 1.2102 0.6931 7.7803
Abs. Diff. in Leverage 6,336 0.0821 0.0389 0.0010 0.4813
Abs. Diff. in Ln Earnings Growth Volatility 6,336 0.0958 0.0422 0.0008 0.3729
Abs. Diff. in Return Volatility 6,336 0.0269 0.0157 0.0001 0.1036
Abs. Diff. in PC GDP in 1980/1990 (in 1,000 USD) 6,336 8.5204 6.7427 0.0012 30.4281
Distance (in 1,000 km) 6,336 1.4133 0.7647 0.0596 4.8821
Common Language Indicator 6,336 0.0683 0.2523 0.0000 1.0000
Eastern Europe Indicator 6,336 0.4124 0.4923 0.0000 1.0000
Abs. EY - Differential: Core Europe vs. USA 6,336 0.0163 0.0070 0.0104 0.0507
Core Europe - Earnings Yield 6,336 0.0609 0.0132 0.0189 0.1043
Trade 6,336 0.0112 0.0173 0.0000 0.2030
FDI 4,085 0.0124 0.0307 -0.0122 0.6342
Capital Account Openness: Average 4,817 2.8086 0.4057 0.0000 3.0000
Capital Account Openness: Difference 4,817 0.2616 0.5811 0.0000 3.0000
Equity Market Openness: Average 6,336 0.8199 0.2666 0.0000 1.0000
Equity Market Openness: Difference 6,336 0.2815 0.4237 0.0000 1.0000
Financial Reform: Average 4,817 17.8604 2.6409 6.8750 21.0000
Financial Reform: Difference 4,817 2.6424 2.2902 0.0000 13.0000
MCAP/GDP: Average 6,336 0.6081 0.4266 0.0300 3.1808
MCAP/GDP: Difference 6,336 0.5283 0.5506 0.0000 3.2654
Absolute Real Interest Differential 4,048 0.0375 0.0341 0.0000 0.3057
Telecommunication: Average 6,336 0.9783 0.4263 0.1671 1.9050
Telecommunication: Difference 6,336 0.2756 0.2363 0.0000 1.2921
